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“You can’t tell one black from another.  They all look alike;”1  “All 
the niggers should hang;”2  “I guess we’re profiling but they cause all 
the trouble;”3  “Let’s be logical.  He’s black and he sees a seventeen 
year old white girl—I know the type.”4  Despite the American ideals of 
equality and justice for all, these words, among others equally or 
more abhorrent, have echoed through jury deliberation rooms across 
the country. 
Though the United States judicial system is rooted in concepts of 
fairness and impartiality, our courts have long held that “[a] defen-
dant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.”5  Nonetheless, 
our society demands that our trial system strive to reflect the tenets of 
basic fairness and a sincere search for justice.  Indeed, the Constitu-
tion, through the Sixth Amendment, enumerates and protects cer-
tain rights of criminal defendants as a necessary underpinning to the 
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 1 Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 2 United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 3 United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4 Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156 (7th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 5 See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 
(1953).  See generally McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 
(1984) (“It seems doubtful that our judicial system would have the resources to provide li-
tigants with perfect trials, were they possible, and still keep abreast of its constantly in-
creasing caseload.”). 
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integrity of criminal trials.6  These rights form the basic foundation of 
a fair trial and include the right to a speedy and public trial,7 the right 
to an attorney,8 and the right to an impartial jury.9  Beyond the Sixth 
Amendment, criminal defendants also find protections in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (“the Rules”).10  However, tensions sometimes ma-
nifest between these two sources of protection regarding the right to 
an impartial jury.11 
Under Rule 606(b), jurors are generally prohibited from provid-
ing post-verdict testimony as to influences or matters discussed dur-
ing jury deliberations (subject to the certain enumerated excep-
tions).12  In Tanner v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that 
Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on inquiry into the validity of verdicts after 
allegations of juror incompetency did not conflict with the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury because the trial process 
provided four sufficient protections for the Constitutional right.13  
According to Tanner, observation of the jury during trial, jurors’ pre-
verdict observations of each other, impeachment of a verdict by “non-
juror evidence of misconduct,” and the voir dire process together 
 
 6 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 (limiting admissibility of character evidence of the accused); 
FED. R. EVID. 410 (limiting admissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related state-
ments). 
 11 See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (addressing the interplay between 
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and Rule 606(b)’s general prohibition on 
post-verdict testimony by jurors regarding jury deliberation). 
 12 FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror 
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s de-
liberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning 
the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.  But a juror may testify about (1) 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s atten-
tion, (2) whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, 
or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.  A ju-
ror’s affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter 
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying.”). 
 13 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (“In light of these other sources of protection of petitioners’ right 
to a competent jury, we conclude that the District Court did not err in deciding, based on 
the inadmissibility of juror testimony [under Rule 606(b)] and the clear insufficiency of 
the nonjuror evidence offered by petitioners, that an additional postverdict evidentiary 
hearing was unnecessary.”). 
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adequately protect a defendant’s right to a competent and unim-
paired jury.14 
Though juror impropriety of any kind threatens the crux of our 
judicial system, racial discrimination in the jury deliberation room is 
particularly abhorrent to our cardinal values of fairness and neutrali-
ty.  Unfortunately, discrimination in this setting is also particularly 
difficult to combat.  The First Circuit has addressed this issue, provid-
ing an approach to dealing with the tension arising between the 
competing objectives of investigating jury verdicts possibly tainted by 
racism and protecting the policy considerations surrounding 
606(b).15  This approach recognizes the salience of the issue of racial 
bias in the context of a jury trial.  The First Circuit acknowledged the 
weaknesses of the Tanner protections at trial in holding that a district 
court judge has the discretion to inquire into the validity of the ver-
dict following legitimate allegations of ethnically biased statements 
during jury deliberations.16  In so holding, the First Circuit recog-
nized the need for the Rules of Evidence to accommodate concerns 
of racial bias.  Where racial discrimination infects a verdict, constitu-
tional implications may and must supersede the requirements under 
the Rules of Evidence; whether by interpretation or by override, 
606(b) must be flexible enough to accommodate to concerns about 
racial bias. 
Other circuits have focused on issues concerning Tanner’s specifi-
cally enumerated protections.  Though Tanner listed the voir dire 
process as an aspect of trial protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment rights,17 recent opinions (including the First Circuit in Villar) 
have questioned the strength of this protection, particularly when ju-
ror racial bias is alleged.18  Appellants have attempted to apply Tan-
 
 14 Id. 
 15 See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“While the issue is difficult and 
close, we believe that the rule against juror impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly 
as to bar juror testimony in those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bi-
as during jury deliberations implicate a defendant’s right to due process and an impartial 
jury.”). 
 16 See id. at 87–88 (“[T]he need to protect a frank and candid jury deliberation process is a 
strong policy consideration.  Still, at the other extreme, there are certain rare and excep-
tional cases involving racial or ethnic prejudice that require hearing jury testimony to de-
termine whether a defendant received a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 17 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (“Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, 
on the other hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process.  The suitability of 
an individual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir 
dire.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (“In our view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner 
Court do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and ethnically biased 
comments made during deliberations.”). 
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ner’s voir dire protection by claiming that trials in which jurors de-
nied racial bias during voir dire, but allegedly exposed such biases 
during deliberations, were structurally defective.19  While the Ninth 
Circuit has held that post-verdict inquiry can be made into juror 
truthfulness during voir dire in this context,20 the Tenth Circuit has 
countered that inquiries into truthfulness at voir dire are identical to 
inquiries into the validity of a jury verdict and thus impermissible.21  
The Tenth Circuit based its decision in large part on Third Circuit 
precedent decided at habeas.22 
This Comment will explore the tensions among the Sixth 
Amendment protection of trial by an impartial jury, juror racism, and 
Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on post-verdict inquiry into juror bias, ex-
amining specifically the voir dire protection enumerated in Tanner.  
Despite the weakness of the voir dire protection and the compelling 
justifications for proscribing inquiry into jury deliberations, a greater 
public injury is inflicted when the voir dire protection is not properly 
enforced. 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the four protections against ju-
ror impropriety described in Tanner and Justice Marshall’s critique of 
that majority opinion.  Part II will examine the recent set of cases ad-
dressing juror racial bias that comprise the circuit split between the 
Ninth and Tenth circuits regarding the voir dire protection as ap-
plied to allegations of racial discrimination post-verdict.  Theoretical-
ly, voir dire protects the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
because attorneys can inquire into juror bias, examine juror conduct, 
and ultimately challenge jurors in that setting; however, whether law-
yers can allege a structural defect in the trial post-verdict due to juror 
misconduct in lying during voir dire remains undefined.  Part III will 
endorse the First Circuit’s approach in resolving the conflicts arising 
among Tanner, 606(b), and combating racial bias in the jury delibera-
tion room.  Part IV will argue that, aside from the voir dire protec-
tion, the remaining three protections enumerated in Tanner are not 
 
 19 See, e.g., Villar, 586 F.3d 76; United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008); Unit-
ed States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001) . 
 20 See Henley, 238 F.3d at 1121 (finding that “evidence of that juror’s alleged racial bias is 
indisputably admissible for the purpose of determining whether the juror’s responses 
were truthful”). 
 21 See Benally, 546 F.3d at 1235 (finding that evidence of alleged racial bias is in essence a 
challenge to the validity of the verdict and therefore inadmissible). 
 22 See Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 235 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that “juror testimony as to 
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations” is cate-
gorically barred, “even if the testimony is not offered to explore the jury’s decision-
making process in reaching the verdict” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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effective in the context of juror racial bias.  Part V will discuss the ex-
tent to which the voir dire protection actually protects at trial, even if 
this protection were optimally enforced.  Ultimately, this protection is 
weak at best.  Lastly, Part VI will conclude that while there are signifi-
cant justifications for prohibiting inquiry into jury deliberations, a 
greater public injury results when inquiry into truthfulness at voir 
dire is barred.  Not only would excluding this exception essentially 
incentivize jurors to lie about racial bias during voir dire, but without 
this protection such lies would be virtually undiscoverable.  The voir 
dire protection may be weak, but because the other three Tanner pro-
tections are so ineffective in the juror racial bias context, without 
properly enforcing the voir dire protection, Tanner’s promises are left 
largely unfulfilled and the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury becomes an aspiration rather than an expectation. 
I.  TANNER’S PROMISE 
Though some might describe serving on a jury as an honor, a civic 
duty, or maybe even an onerous obligation, at least one juror impa-
neled in Tanner v. United States viewed the process as “one big party.”23  
Not only did the Tanner jurors allegedly sell and consume alcohol 
and illegal drugs throughout the trial, but one juror allegedly in-
voked the word “flying” to summarize his condition throughout.24  Af-
ter rendering a guilty verdict, another juror was so stunned by the en-
tire process that he felt compelled to admit these acts because “the 
people on the jury didn’t have no business being on the jury.”25  De-
spite these appalling allegations, the Supreme Court upheld the dis-
trict court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing concerning the jurors’ 
drug and alcohol use at trial based on Rule 606(b) and the 
“[s]ubstantial policy considerations support[ing] the common-law 
rule against the admission of jury testimony to impeach a verdict.”26 
The Court quoted an earlier decision in McDonald v. Pless to ex-
plain the imperative need to protect the privacy of jury deliberations 
post-verdict: 
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly re-
turned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those 
who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many 
would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something 
which might invalidate the finding.  Jurors would be harassed and beset 
 
 23 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 115 (1987). 
 24 Id. at 115–16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25 Id. at 116 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26 Id. at 119. 
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by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts 
which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.  If evi-
dence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what 
was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public 
investigation—to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discus-
sion and conference.27 
Ultimately, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Tanner majority, con-
cluded that though post-verdict inquiry into juror misconduct in 
many cases would very likely reveal improper jury behavior and lead 
to the invalidation of such verdicts, “[i]t is not at all clear, however, 
that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.”28 
The policy concerns in shielding jury verdicts from juror testimo-
ny are not outweighed by the Sixth Amendment right to a fair and 
impartial jury, according to the Tanner majority, because the trial 
process itself offers sufficient protections of the constitutional right.29  
These protections include the voir dire process, observation of the 
jury by the court and attorneys, observation of the jurors by each oth-
er, and the opportunity to impeach the verdict by non-juror evidence 
of misconduct.30  Though the Tanner majority found these four pro-
tections satisfactory, trials such as Tanner’s nonetheless continue to 
yield unsavory results.  This problem is compounded when allega-
tions suggest juror racism as opposed to readily observable and prov-
able qualities such as intoxication.  In such cases, the Tanner protec-
tions are even less effective—if not completely ineffective—in 
preserving the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
The idea that Tanner’s protections were inadequate was suggested 
as early as the case itself, in Justice Marshall’s dissent from the majori-
ty opinion.31  According to Justice Marshall, the enumerated protec-
tions failed in Tanner’s case because a juror’s intention to utilize 
drugs during trial is not readily discoverable during voir dire, the ju-
rors were not observed consuming illegal substances and actually 
 
 27 Id. at 119–20 (alteration in original) (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267–68 
(1915)). 
 28 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120. 
 29 See id. at 127 (“Petitioners’ Sixth Amendment interests in an unimpaired jury, on the oth-
er hand, are protected by several aspects of the trial process.  The suitability of an indi-
vidual for the responsibility of jury service, of course, is examined during voir dire.  More-
over, during the trial the jury is observable by the court, by counsel, and by court 
personnel.  Moreover, jurors are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate 
juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict.  Finally, after the trial a party may 
seek to impeach the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 141–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Reliance on these safeguards, to the exclusion of 
an evidentiary hearing, is misguided.”). 
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purposefully evaded such observation, and these acts could not be 
proven through non-juror testimony.32  Justice Marshall agreed with 
Justice O’Connor’s contention that the jury system cannot be per-
fect,33 but noted that to protect the Sixth Amendment right, the 
Court must determine not whether the trial was a perfect one, but 
“whether the jury that heard the[] case behaved in a manner conso-
nant with the minimum requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  If 
we deny [litigants] . . . this opportunity, the jury system may survive, 
but the constitutional guarantee on which it is based will become meaning-
less.”34 
II.  RACISM IN THE COURTS:  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER VOIR DIRE 
Since Tanner was decided in 1987, the circuits have split over how 
to address the application of precedent and the interplay between 
Rule 606(b) and the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 
when juror racial bias is alleged post-verdict.  Whether Tanner’s voir 
dire protection can be invoked to allege a structural defect in a trial 
when post-conviction juror evidence suggests a juror has failed to be 
truthful at voir dire remains an open question.  While the First and 
Ninth Circuits’ precedents suggest that those courts may be receptive 
to such arguments, the Third and Tenth Circuits’ precedents imply a 
converse approach. 
One of the earliest cases to discuss the racial bias issue in conjunc-
tion with Rule 606(b), preceding even Tanner, was the Western Dis-
trict of New York’s decision in Tobias v. Smith, which granted a hear-
ing to investigate such allegations of racial bias.35  In Tobias,36 a juror 
submitted an affidavit to defense counsel post-conviction asserting 
that several members of the all-white jury had been prejudiced 
against the black defendant.37  In response, the Western District of 
New York held that in order to uphold the fundamental tenet of the 
judicial system that every defendant receive a fair trial, an evidentiary 
hearing must be granted to further explore the accusation of racial 
 
 32 Id. 
 33 See generally Andrew C. Helman, Comment, Racism, Juries, and Justice:  Addressing Post-
Verdict Juror Testimony of Racial Prejudice During Deliberations, 62 ME. L. REV. 327, 332 (2010) 
(discussing and analyzing Justice Marshall’s dissent in Tanner). 
 34 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 35 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (W.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 36 Tobias involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Id. at 1287. 
 37 According to that juror, the jury foreman had instructed the other jurors that the photo 
identification was irrelevant because “[y]ou can’t tell one black from another.  They all 
look alike.”  Id. at 1289.  Another juror had voiced that the white victims ought to be be-
lieved over the black defendant.  Id.  
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bias.38  In addressing the 606(b) conflict, the court referenced the 
voir dire process: 
[W]here comments indicate prejudice or preconceived notions of guilt, 
statements may be admissible not under F.R.E. 606(b) but because they 
may prove that a juror lied during the voir dire.  Such evidence can be 
used to show that a juror should be disqualified by his prejudice and that 
the verdict in which he participated was a nullity.39 
Following this analysis, the court concluded that the affidavit served 
as a sufficient signal that racial bias inflicted an inappropriate influ-
ence on the jury’s verdict, necessitating a hearing to further investi-
gate because such improper influences cannot be deemed “merely 
matters of jury deliberations.”40 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Tanner, however, the rea-
soning supporting the Western District of New York’s decision in To-
bias seems murkier.  The Ninth Circuit addressed the conflict be-
tween truthfulness during voir dire and Rule 606(b) in United States v. 
Henley in 2001, holding that Rule 606(b) does not bar evidence of ju-
ror racial bias when a juror may have lied during voir dire.41  In Hen-
ley, jurors, who later convicted the defendants of conspiracy to distri-
bute cocaine, had been posed specific questions regarding their 
feelings on race at voir dire and answered in the negative.42  After tri-
al, however, one juror provided a deposition stating that another ju-
ror had made racist comments while carpooling to and from court, 
including stating that “all the niggers should hang.”43  Although the 
Ninth Circuit noted the conflict with Rule 606(b), it concluded: 
Racial prejudice is plainly a mental bias that is unrelated to any specific 
issue that a juror in a criminal case may legitimately be called upon to de-
termine.  It would seem, therefore, to be consistent with the text of the 
rule, as well as with the broad goal of eliminating racial prejudice from 
the judicial system, to hold that evidence of racial bias is generally not 
subject to Rule 606(b)’s prohibitions against juror testimony.44 
 
 38 Id.  (“The integrity of the judicial system depends on the guarantee that every litigant re-
ceive a fair trial.  The concomitant policy of redressing the injury of the private litigant, 
where a verdict was reached by a jury which was not impartial in an individual case, re-
quires an accommodation of the conflicting policies.” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
 39 Id. at 1290 (citations omitted). 
 40 Id. 
 41 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 42 Id. at 1111–14.  Jurors had been asked “what their overall views were of interracial dating, 
whether they had ever had a bad experience with a person of a different race, and wheth-
er race would influence their decisions in any way.”  Id. at 1114. 
 43 Id. at 1113 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44 Id. at 1120 (footnote omitted). 
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The court then proceeded to explain that in order to constitute a 
Sixth Amendment violation, prejudice need not have “pervaded the 
jury room;” rather, even “[o]ne racist juror would be enough.”45  Ul-
timately the Ninth Circuit’s decision turned on the lack of truthful-
ness during voir dire, holding that 
[w]here, as here, a juror has been asked direct questions about racial bias 
during voir dire, and has sworn that racial bias would play no part in his 
deliberations, evidence of that juror’s alleged racial bias is indisputably 
admissible for the purpose of determining whether the juror’s responses 
were truthful.46 
According to the Ninth Circuit, if a litigant is able to demonstrate 
that a juror answered dishonestly during voir dire and a truthful an-
swer would have resulted in a valid for-cause challenge, the litigant is 
entitled to a new trial.47  Notably, however, the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion is somewhat cabined as in Henley, the challenged statements were 
made outside the courthouse while carpooling rather than in the jury 
deliberation room.48  However, because the Ninth Circuit allowed in-
quiry based on a structural defect in the trial’s voir dire, it avoided 
the issue of whether the Rules’ protection extended to statements 
made outside of deliberations but during trial.49 
Since Henley was decided, the courts have not been entirely clear 
on the precedent the case sets.50  The Ninth Circuit itself has, in at 
least one case, United States v. Decoud,51 limited Henley’s analysis that 
racial bias may be an exception to 606(b) prohibition on juror testi-
mony to dictum.52  The dissent in Decoud, however, argued for an op-
posite interpretation of Henley, stating:  
 
 45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46 Id. at 1121. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 1112. 
 49 Id. at 1121 (“[W]e need not decide today whether or to what extent the rule prohibits 
juror testimony concerning racist statements made during deliberations or, as in this 
case, outside of deliberations but during the course of the trial.”). 
 50 See Helman, supra note 33, at 335 (“[T]he apparent split between the Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits shows that the federal courts have little clarity or unanimity to offer on this issue 
and seem to disagree on the meaning of the rule and these cases.”). 
 51 456 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 52 Id. at 1018–19 (“Although Henley implied in dictum that evidence of racial prejudice 
might be exempt from Rule 606(b)’s restriction on post-trial evidence, Henley was specifi-
cally referring to racial bias ‘unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon 
to decide.’” (quoting Henley, 238 F.3d at 1120)).  The Decoud majority attempted to dis-
tinguish Henley by arguing that while in Henley the allegations indicated that a juror had 
been racially biased, the juror in Decoud had been dismissed on a completely distinct 
ground:  her religious convictions.  Id.  Though that juror had not participated in the 
verdict, she later indicated that as the sole black juror she had felt racial pressure because 
she had been a “holdout” vote.  Id. at 1019; see also Helman, supra note 33, at 335 n.68 (“In 
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[T]he majority misconstrues . . . Henley, which persuasively reasons that 
racial prejudice is a mental bias that is never acceptable in the jury room.  
Instead of disregarding Henley, we should apply its reasoning to hold that 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) does not bar testimony regarding evi-
dence of racial prejudice within the jury.53   
Citing to Henley, the dissent continued, “[w]e refuse to be a society in 
which a defendant’s guilt or innocence is decided by the color of her 
skin.  Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment entitles every defendant to 
an impartial, unbiased jury.”54 
Following the Henley decision, however, the Tenth Circuit has tak-
en the opposite approach in United States v. Benally, holding that juror 
testimony that another juror failed to answer truthfully during voir 
dire cannot be used to overturn a verdict.55  Benally, a Native Ameri-
can, had been accused of assault with a dangerous weapon, and prior 
to his trial the judge had questioned jurors as to possible racial bias at 
voir dire.56  Following Benally’s conviction, however, a juror ap-
proached the defense to reveal that racist comments against Native 
Americans had clouded the deliberations.57  Unlike the Ninth Circuit 
in Henley, however, the Tenth Circuit provided a contrary analysis, 
denying a hearing to investigate a structural defect in voir dire, hold-
ing that 
[a]lthough the immediate purpose of introducing the testimony may 
have been to show that the two jurors failed to answer honestly during 
voir dire, the sole point of this showing was to support a motion to vacate 
the verdict, and for a new trial.  That is a challenge to the validity of the 
verdict. . . . . [I]f the purpose of the post-verdict proceeding were to 
charge the jury foreman or the other juror with contempt of court, Rule 
606(b) would not apply.  However, it does not follow that juror testimony 
that shows a failure to answer honestly during voir dire can be used to 
overturn the verdict.58 
According to the Tenth Circuit, if it followed the Ninth Circuit’s 
precedent of “allowing juror testimony through the backdoor of a 
 
Decoud, a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit characterized Henley’s argument on racial 
prejudice as dicta, while the dissent forcefully disagreed with that characterization.”). 
 53 Decoud, 456 F.3d at 1022 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 54 Id. at 1023. 
 55 United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 56 Id. at 1231.  The judge asked:  “Would the fact that the defendant is a Native American 
affect your evaluation of the case?” and “Have you ever had a negative experience with 
any individuals of Native American descent?  And, if so, would that experience affect your 
evaluation of the facts of this case?”  All jurors replied in the negative.  Id. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 57 Id. at 1231–32.  According to the juror, the foreman stated, “[w]hen Indians get alcohol, 
they all get drunk,” and jurors discussed “send[ing] a message back to the reservation.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 58 Id. at 1235 (citations omitted). 
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voir dire challenge”59 it would risk “swallowing the rule.”60  The Tenth 
Circuit concluded its analysis by referencing Justice O’Connor’s 
proposition in Tanner that “[w]e must remember that the Sixth 
Amendment embodies a right to ‘a fair trial but not a perfect one, for 
there are no perfect trials.’”61 
Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision in Henley in its analysis, it was swayed ultimately by Third Cir-
cuit precedent in Williams v. Price,62 which held that a state court’s de-
cision that the no impeachment-rule bars post-verdict juror testimony 
as to statements made during deliberation was not “contrary to” or 
“an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.”63  
Because the Third Circuit decided Williams at habeas, however, it has 
been suggested that the core precedent underlying the Benally deci-
sion is not entirely persuasive, limiting the implications of the Tenth 
Circuit’s response to the Ninth.64  Moreover, as other notes have ar-
 
 59 Id. at 1236. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1240 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 
(1984)). 
 62 Benally, 546 F.3d at 1235–36 (“The Third Circuit, by contrast, has held that such an inter-
pretation would be ‘plainly too broad,’ and that Rule 606(b) ‘categorically bar[s] juror 
testimony ‘as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s delibe-
rations’ even if the testimony is not offered to explore the jury’s decision-making process 
in reaching the verdict.’ . . . The Third Circuit’s approach best comports with Rule 
606(b), and we follow it here.” (quoting Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 235 (3rd Cir. 
2003))). 
 63 Williams, 343 F.3d at 237 (“We emphasize that we do not hold that testimony of the type 
at issue is inadmissible under Rule 606(b) or any other particular version of the ‘no im-
peachment’ rule.  We express no view on those questions.  We hold only that the exclu-
sion of such testimony is not irrational and does not contravene or represent an unreasonable ap-
plication of clearly established federal law.” (emphasis added)). 
 64 See id. at 239 (“Our role in this case, however, is not to interpret Rule 606(b) or any other 
version of the ‘no impeachment’ rule but merely to determine whether the state courts 
contravened or unreasonably applied ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by 
the Supreme Court.’ . . . [No] Supreme Court decision clearly establishes that it is un-
constitutional for a state to apply a ‘no impeachment’ rule that does not contain an ex-
ception for juror testimony about racial bias on the part of jurors.”); see also Benally, 546 
F.3d at 1230, reh’g en banc denied, 560 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., dissent-
ing) (“Further, although the panel suggests its conclusion is consistent with the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Price, that decision is distinguishable because it involved 
an appeal from the denial of a state prisoner’s habeas petition, and decided only that Su-
preme Court precedent did not ‘clearly establish[] that it [wa]s unconstitutional for a 
state to apply a ‘no impeachment’ rule that d[id] not contain an exception for juror tes-
timony about racial bias on the part of jurors.’  In other words, the Third Circuit did not 
directly resolve the issue we now face.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); 
Brandon C. Pond, Note, Juror Testimony of Racial Bias in Jury Deliberations:  United States v. 
Benally and the Obstacle of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 246–47 
(2010) (“Under this strict standard, the Third Circuit was not evaluating whether chal-
lenges to voir dire must comply with the requirements of Rule 606(b), but whether it was 
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gued, the Tenth Circuit’s argument that allowing evidence for the 
purpose of examining voir dire, as opposed to challenging the validi-
ty of the verdict based on juror testimony, is weaker than at first 
glance because “[t]he Rules of Evidence constantly permit evidence 
to be admitted for one purpose while forbidding it for others—even 
though the practical effect is the same.”65  As Judge Briscoe clarified 
in his dissent to the Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, holding a 
hearing to investigate whether jurors responded truthfully during 
voir dire does not equate challenging the validity of the verdict be-
cause if the jurors did, in fact, reply dishonestly, the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury had been violated.66  Judge 
Briscoe states “[t]hus, contrary to being an ‘inquiry into the validity 
of the verdict’ rendered by the jury in his case, Mr. Benally’s claim is 
more properly viewed as an inquiry into ‘the legitimacy of [the] pre-
trial procedures,’ and, in turn, the constitutionality of the overall 
proceedings.”67 
Currently, the split between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits remains 
unresolved. 
III.  THE FIRST CIRCUIT APPROACH TO TANNER AND RACIAL BIAS,  “A 
CONSTITUTIONAL OUTER LIMIT” 
Most recently, the First Circuit has addressed the issue of post-
verdict allegations of juror racial bias in United States v. Villar,68 which 
considered the extent of a district court’s discretion to hold a hearing 
following allegations of racial bias and stated that the applicability of 
the Tanner precedent is limited in this context.69  In Villar, the defen-
dant’s lawyer received an e-mail from a juror admitting that some ju-
rors had engaged in racial profiling in convicting Villar, a Hispanic 
man, of bank robbery.70  In reaching its decision, the First Circuit 
considered the varying interpretations of 606(b) and racial bias pro-
 
clearly established that voir dire challenges are beyond the scope of Rule 606(b). . . . [T]he 
Third Circuit’s decision seems appropriate under a ‘clearly established’ standard, but ul-
timately unhelpful to the Benally controversy.  Once the Third Circuit decision is limited 
to its appropriate contours, the only circuit to squarely address the issue is the Ninth Cir-
cuit.”). 
 65 Pond, supra note 65, at 247. 
 66 See Benally, 560 F.3d at 1153 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. (alteration in original). 
 68 586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 69 Although Villar did not concern allegations of a structural defect in voir dire, the court 
reaches relevant discussion of the implication of allegations of racism in jury trials and 
the protections our system provides.  See infra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text. 
 70 Villar, 586 F.3d at 78. 
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vided by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and first concluded, as the 
Tenth Circuit had, that under its express terms, 606(b) prohibits ju-
ror testimony about comments made during deliberations, including 
racial comments.71  However, the First Circuit ultimately embraced a 
much different approach from the Tenth, holding: 
While the issue is difficult and close, we believe that the rule against juror 
impeachment cannot be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony in 
those rare and grave cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during 
jury deliberations implicate a defendant’s right to due process and an 
impartial jury.  In our view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner 
Court do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and 
ethnically biased comments made during deliberations.72 
This Comment endorses the First Circuit approach.  According to 
that Court, racial bias is an exceptional context in which the Tanner 
protections are simply too deficient to guard the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.73  Essentially, though Rule 606(b) and Tan-
ner protect significant policy concerns, there is a “constitutional outer 
limit” to their applicability.74  Racial discrimination stands in opposi-
tion to the very essence of a fair trial; at the point where racial bias 
taints a jury verdict, constitutional implications must supersede the 
policy considerations of precluding inquiry into jury verdicts. 
IV.  THE WEAKNESS OF TANNER’S PROTECTIONS IN THE FACE OF RACIAL 
BIAS 
In the years since Justice Marshall’s dissent in Tanner, legal scho-
larship and case law have continued to address the limits and insuffi-
ciencies of the case’s four Sixth Amendment protections.75  In the 
 
 71 See id. at 83–84 (“We are persuaded by the courts that have held that Rule 606(b), by its 
express terms, precludes any inquiry into the validity of the verdict based on juror testi-
mony regarding racial or ethnic comments made ‘during the course of deliberations.’”). 
 72 Id. at 87. 
 73 See id. at 87–88 (“[T]here are certain rare and exceptional cases involving racial or ethnic 
prejudice that require hearing jury testimony to determine whether a defendant received 
a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 74 Id. at 88. 
 75 See, e.g., Helman, supra note 33, at 332 (“While Tanner played a pivotal role in the Tenth 
Circuit’s conclusion that juror testimony is barred, anecdotal evidence, recent court deci-
sions, and social science research raise serious questions about . . . the Court’s conclusion 
that Sixth Amendment rights are adequately protected earlier in the trial process.”); see 
also Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (“In our view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court 
do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and ethnically biased com-
ments made during deliberations.”); United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th 
Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that “[e]ach protection might not be equally efficacious in 
every instance of jury misconduct” but concluding that “[t]hese protections might not be 
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context of allegations of juror racial bias, the Tanner protections are 
particularly weak.76  It is true that Tanner’s first protection of visual 
observation by court personnel, the court itself, and attorneys might 
prove effective in some instances of readily observable conduct such 
as intoxicated behavior.  However, racist opinions and biases are in-
ternal feelings that are not evident to the naked eye, except in partic-
ularly extreme and egregious circumstances.77  Unlike the influence 
of drugs, racism is not revealed by overt physical features or demarca-
tions.  Moreover, accusations of racism are particularly incendiary 
and a court will likely be hesitant to inflict such a charge absent clear 
evidence.  To support the protection of the observation by court, 
court personnel, and counsel, the Tanner Court cited to United States 
v. Provenzano.78  In Provenzano, counsel consented to a judge’s decision 
not to take action after two jurors were observed smoking marijuana 
while sequestered during trial and the Third Circuit affirmed the 
conviction on appeal because the lawyer’s decision had been a tactic-
al one.79  However, like Tanner, Provenzano is equally inapplicable to 
issues pertaining to juror racial bias because unlike drug use, racism 
need not manifest in any physical, observable act.80 
Moreover, even in rare cases where counsel is able to visually iden-
tify racism, a mere allegation may prove insufficient.81  For example, 
in United States v. Abcasis, though defense counsel was able to observe 
a juror gesturing in a manner that signaled her bias against the de-
fendants and making Anti-Semitic comments regarding the defen-
dants, the court found the allegations insufficient without counsel 
proffering concrete evidence.82  Ultimately, the jury rendered a guilty 
verdict and the district court denied the motion for a new trial due to 
 
sufficient to eliminate every partial juror, just as in Tanner they proved insufficient to 
catch every intoxicated juror, but jury perfection is an untenable goal”). 
 76 See Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (stating that Tanner’s protections prove inadequate in the con-
text of racial comments made during jury deliberations).  But see Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 
(“The safeguards that the Court relied upon for exposing the drug and alcohol use 
amongst jurors in Tanner are also available to expose racial biases of the sort alleged in 
Mr. Benally’s case.”). 
 77 See Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (“[V]isual observations of the jury by counsel and the court dur-
ing trial are unlikely to identify jurors harboring racial or ethnic bias.”). 
 78 United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 996–97 (3d Cir. 1980).  
 79 Id. 
 80 See Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240 (“Each protection might not be equally efficacious in every 
instance of jury misconduct.  The judge will probably not be able to identify racist jurors 
based on trial conduct as easily as he could identify drunken jurors, for instance . . . .”). 
 81 See, e.g., United States v. Abcasis, 811 F. Supp. 828, 830 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying a defen-
dant a new trial post-verdict despite claims of observing a juror making racist gestures 
throughout trial). 
 82 Id. at 830. 
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misconduct because the court determined counsel had not fully and 
adequately presented the allegations and thus waived the right.83 
The second protection enumerated by the Tanner court, juror ob-
servations of each other during the course of trial, proves equally 
problematic to the first protection.  Even more so than court person-
nel, a judge, or a lawyer, a juror may be extremely hesitant to accuse a 
fellow juror of racism without clear evidence, and such accusations 
are by their nature ambiguous as it is not possible to know what is in 
another’s mind.84  Furthermore, jurors are prohibited from deliberat-
ing before the completion of trial and so any discussion among jurors 
before the end of trial would, in an optimal situation, be limited.85  
Though Tanner cited McIlwain v. United States to support this protec-
tion, that case, in which jurors informed the judge that the foreper-
son was unable to preside during trial because he was intoxicated, is 
easily distinguishable from the race context because intoxication is 
overtly recognizable.86 
The last protection enumerated by Tanner (aside from voir dire), 
non-juror evidence of misconduct, faces comparable challenges in 
the racial bias context.87  In support of this protection, Tanner cited 
United States v. Taliaferro.88  In Taliaferro, the court was able to review 
the dining records of the jurors in question and consider the testi-
mony of a marshal who accompanied the jurors in deciding whether 
jurors were intoxicated during deliberations.89  However, such specific 
evidence would rarely be available in the context of racial bias.  Even 
if evidence such as membership in an openly racist group or atten-
 
 83 Id. at 831–32. 
 84 Cf. United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Because the bias of a juror 
will rarely be admitted by the juror himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest 
in concealing his own bias and partly because the juror may be unaware of it,’ . . . it nec-
essarily must be inferred from surrounding facts and circumstances.” (quoting McDo-
nough Power Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring)) 
(alteration in original)). 
 85 However, juries do not always abide by this instruction.  See generally Shari Seidman Di-
amond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials:  Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2003) (analyzing pre-deliberation jury discussions and considering 
whether such discussion leads to premature judgments or otherwise negatively influences 
deliberations). 
 86 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (citing Lee v. United States, 454 A.2d 
770 (D.D.C. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. McIlwain v. United States, 464 U.S. 972 (1983)). 
 87 See Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (“Likewise, non-jurors are more likely to report inappropriate 
conduct—such as alcohol or drug use—among jurors than racial statements uttered dur-
ing deliberations to which they are not privy.”). 
 88 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127 (citing United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724, 725–26 (4th Cir. 
1977)). 
 89 Taliaferro, 558 F.2d at 725–26. 
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dance of a racially targeted event were available, such evidence would 
not be conclusive as to a person’s inner sentiment.  A dining bill, 
however, can readily demonstrate how much alcohol was consumed 
in one sitting.90 
Essentially, setting aside the voir dire protection, the other three 
protections of the Sixth Amendment right presented by the Tanner 
court are largely—if not wholly—inapplicable in the context of racial 
bias. 
V.  THE WEAKNESS OF VOIR DIRE AS A SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
As the First Circuit concluded in Villar, all four Tanner protections 
for the Sixth Amendment right are insufficient in the context of ra-
cial bias.91  Though the Ninth Circuit in Henley recognized voir dire as 
a somewhat stronger protection, allowing a litigant to challenge 
structural defects in the trial if jurors were dishonest, the protection 
is overall weak at best.  First, the power of voir dire depends on how 
the process is conducted and to what extent issues are probed; this 
decision lies in the discretion of the trial judge, who (subject to some 
limitations) holds significant power.92  Second, jurors may choose to 
conceal information regarding their racial bias during voir dire, and 
might even have motivation to do so in cases where such bias would 
 
 90 See, e.g., id. (“It appears from the records of the club where the jurors ate dinner . . . that 
the group of twelve jurors ordered ten cocktails and two soft drinks.  The Marshal who 
accompanied the jurors to the club testified that only one round of drinks was ordered.  
The most obvious inference from these two facts is that ten of the twelve jurors had one 
cocktail apiece and the remaining two jurors had soft drinks.”). 
 91 See Villar, 586 F.3d at 87 (“In our view, the four protections relied on by the Tanner Court 
do not provide adequate safeguards in the context of racially and ethnically biased com-
ments made during deliberations.”). 
 92 See M.A. Widder, Neutralizing the Poison of Juror Racism:  The Need for a Sixth Amendment Ap-
proach to Jury Selection, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2311, 2324 n.48 (1993) (“[T]he means of ensuring 
juror impartiality are themselves inadequate to prevent the infiltration of even detectable 
racial bias into the jury . . . . [Q]uestions of whether voir dire on racial bias may be con-
ducted, and the permitted scope of such an examination, are largely left to the trial 
court’s discretion.  However, very few state courts have recognized a universal state statu-
tory or constitutional requirement for voir dire on racial prejudice, and most do not rec-
ognize the right even under inflammatory factual circumstances.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(holding that a District Judge abused his discretion when he conducted a voir dire during 
jury deliberations upon learning anti-Semitic jokes had been made, but allowed the jurors 
to continue after they claimed they had not been “affected” by the prejudiced com-
ments); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 
1670 (1985) (stating the purposes of voir dire cannot “be fulfilled unless sufficient ques-
tions are asked to probe relevant attitudes” but notes that in recent cases, “disputes over 
what questions must be allowed overwhelmingly predominate”). 
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be implicated.93  Even the Tenth Circuit in Benally noted that “voir 
dire might be a feeble protection if a juror is determined to lie.”94  
Moreover, as Judge Briscoe noted in his dissent to the denial of re-
hearing en banc for Benally, racial prejudice is particularly subject to 
this weakness of identification in voir dire as it can be easily con-
cealed.95 
Third, the voir dire protection is weak because many attorneys 
may strategically refrain from requesting voir dire questions regard-
ing racial bias as such questioning can lead to problematic and anti-
thetical results.96  As discussed above, the other protections offered by 
Tanner are largely unsuccessful in the context of racial bias; there-
fore, by effectively requiring a criminal defendant to discuss preju-
dice during voir dire in order to preserve even some protection, such 
 
 93 See e.g., United States v. Benally, No. 2:07CR256 DAK, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85620, at *5 
(D. Utah November 20, 2007), rev’d, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008) (granting a motion 
for a new trial post-verdict after determining that two jurors had dishonestly remained si-
lent during voir dire when asked whether they held any prejudice or preconceived no-
tions about Native Americans that might result in bias and they failed to disclose bias de-
veloped after living near a reservation).  Though it was later reversed by the Tenth 
Circuit, the District Court originally argued that “[b]y failing to give truthful answers to 
the voir dire questions targeted at determining racial prejudice, the jurors were allowed to 
sit on the jury despite their bias.  As a result, Mr. Benally was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.”  Id.  at *5. 
 94 Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240.  But see id. (“This does not mean that defendants’ interest in an 
impartial jury will go unprotected.  Voir dire can still uncover racist predilections, espe-
cially when backed up by the threat of contempt or perjury prosecutions.”). 
 95 Id. at 1230, reh’g en banc denied, 560 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., dissent-
ing) (“Unlike jurors’ ingestion of alcohol or drugs, the act and effect of which can be ob-
served by others and brought to the attention of the district court, jurors’ racial biases can 
be much more easily hidden from observation.  Indeed, that appears to be precisely what 
occurred here:  despite the district court’s best efforts at protecting Mr. Benally’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury, the jury foreman clearly lied during the voir dire 
proceedings about his ability to be impartial.”). 
 96 See Brief of Appellee at 10–11, 26–27, United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(No. 08-1154) (“The court did consider that a way to address the possibility of prejudice 
playing a part in the deliberative process was through jury voir dire, but acknowledged 
that defense attorneys may shy away from such inquiries and highlighting the ethnic ori-
gin of their clients . . . . Understandably Villar’s defense may have chosen not to suggest 
voir dire questions regarding ethnic bias for tactical reasons.  It may work to a defen-
dant’s benefit not to draw the jury’s attention to his background, especially when it may 
become an issue in the case, such as in Villar’s.”); see also Ted A. Donner & Richard K. 
Gabriel, Jury Selection Strategy and Science (database), § 33:1 (3d Ed.) Significance of 
Questions Concerning Race and Gender Bias (“Race and gender bias may be appropriate rea-
sons for excusing prospective jurors, but the subjects should probably not be specifically 
addressed, in any voir dire, unless the facts of the case suggest that racism could be a dis-
positive factor . . . . On the other hand, whenever a prospective juror uses a choice of 
terms that suggest a tendency to racial or gender bias, attorneys should weigh the possi-
bility of exposing such a bias through further questions against the effect of such an ex-
amination on other jurors.”). 
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a litigant may be ultimately tactically disadvantaged by the “backlash 
effect” of bringing these issues to the forefront.97  Lastly, even when 
voir dire as to racial bias is conducted, the questions posed may be in-
sufficient to reveal racist tendencies that might be exposed during de-
liberations because jurors may not be fully conscious of their preju-
dices.98  As Sherri Lynn Johnson elaborated on the weakness of voir 
dire questioning in her article, Black Innocence and the White Jury: 99 
First, superficial questions concerning whether the jurors harbor preju-
dice against blacks that would prevent them from being impartial are ex-
tremely unlikely to provoke disclosure of such bias.  General questions do 
not reach hidden inconsistent attitudes, which research has shown are 
now prevalent about race.  Asking a general question about impartiality 
and race is like asking whether one believes in equality for blacks; jurors 
may sincerely answer yes, they believe in equality and yes, they can be 
impartial, yet oppose interracial marriage and believe that blacks are 
more prone to violence.  Those attorneys who have been permitted to 
 
 97 See, e.g., David A. Anglier & Janet Kenton-Walker, Impaneling the Jury, in MASSACHUSETTS 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, MASSACHUSETTS SUPERIOR COURT CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
MANUAL 11-19 (Hon. Robert H. Bohn, Jr., ed. 2006) (“Most importantly, discuss with your 
client the possibility of a ‘backlash’ effect from voir dire questions about racial or ethnic 
bias.  Persons who hold biases or prejudices are often unconscious of them or reluctant to 
admit them.  Juror questions on bias may bring those biases to the forefront, but the ju-
rors holding them may not respond honestly to the specific questions.  Thus, specific 
questions on racial or ethnic bias may inject racial bias into a trial rather than remove 
it.”).  But see Brief of Appellee, supra note 96, at 27 (“But enforcing Rule 606(b) does not 
mean that the defendant is totally stripped of remedy and that he cannot or did not have 
a fair trial by a competent jury under the Sixth Amendment.”). 
 98 See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1023, 
1030–31 (2008) (“[T]he harsh reality for judges conducting voir dire aimed at seating on-
ly fair and impartial jurors is that the jurors themselves may not be able to assist be-
cause . . . ‘we restrict our own speech because we cannot bear admitting our own racism.’  
If true, how can judges posing such questions, as I have, expect to get valid responses, 
particularly where an honest response about one’s operative biases requires conscious in-
sight into one’s unconscious? . . . . I took little reassurance from these jurors’ sincere be-
lief that they held no racial attitudes that had played any role in their verdict.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Regina A. Schuller et al., The Impact of Prejudice Screening Procedures on Racial Bi-
as in the Courtroom, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 320, 321 (2009) (arguing self-assessment of pre-
judice and discrimination may often be incorrect as “people may be unaware of existing 
biases and often maintain that they are personally fair and egalitarian” and “even if 
people are able to identify the possibility that they may be biased against Blacks, they may 
not fully understand how and to what extent biases can affect their decisions”); see also 
Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:  The Problems 
of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV 149, 158–60 (2010) (arguing that the practice of judge-dominated voir dire 
may actually allow jurors with implicit bias to be empanelled, stating:  “[J]udges common-
ly ask questions such as, ‘Can all of you be fair and impartial in this case?’ This question 
does not begin to address implicit bias, which by its nature is not consciously known to 
the prospective juror.  Thus, a trial court judge schooled in the basics of implicit bias 
would be delusional to assume that this question adequately solves implicit bias”). 
 99 Johnson, supra note 92.  
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conduct extended voir dire report that it is only when numerous sensitive 
and specific questions are asked that prospective jurors reveal racial pre-
judice.  Furthermore, even if extensive questions were asked, jurors 
might not answer honestly.  Most prejudiced attitudes are now highly dis-
approved, and jurors would naturally be reluctant to admit them, particu-
larly since they know that social disapproval will be publicly expressed by 
dismissing them from the venire.  This natural reluctance is probably ex-
acerbated by the practice of questioning the entire venire as a group, for 
it is easier to stay quiet untruthfully than to respond untruthfully.  Even if 
extensive individual questioning were routinely permitted in black de-
fendants’ cases, fear of social disapproval would probably inhibit many 
individuals from expressing their true views.100 
In sum, in the context of racial bias, the voir dire protection is weak 
at best and, even if litigants are able fully take advantage of the op-
portunity, they might harm their case in other ways by discussing race 
in such a central way. 
VI.  A GREATER PUBLIC INJURY 
Ultimately, it is undeniable that there are many persuasive justifi-
cations for proscribing inquiry into jury verdicts,101 even in cases 
where racial bias of a juror is alleged.102  These justifications are all 
the more convincing, when one considers how weak the protection of 
allowing post-verdict juror testimony as to a structural defect at voir 
dire provides.103  However, allowing verdicts to stand without inquiry 
after legitimate allegations of juror racism have been presented is an 
affront to the very foundation of our judicial system.104 
 
100 Id. at 1675 (footnotes omitted). 
101 See, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1987) (“It is not at all clear, how-
ever, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.  Allegations of juror mis-
conduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or 
months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process.  Moreover, full and 
frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and 
the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople would all be 
undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.” (citation omitted)). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The rule protects 
the finality of verdicts.  It protects jurors from harassment by counsel seeking to nullify a 
verdict.  It reduces the incentive for jury tampering.  It promotes free and frank jury dis-
cussions that would be chilled if threatened by the prospect of later being called to the 
stand.  Finally, it preserves the ‘community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions 
of laypeople [that] would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny.’” (alte-
ration in original) (quoting Tanner, 283 U.S. at 121)). 
103 See discussion, supra Part V. 
104 See Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. 
JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 125, 139 (1993) (“When a jury employs racial bias in reaching a 
verdict, concern for fairness and accuracy outweigh the policy goal of finality.  Employing 
racial bias to reach a verdict is analogous to flipping a coin.  The verdict is no less arbi-
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In United States v. Dean105 the Eastern District of Arkansas granted a 
defendant a new trial post-verdict after learning that a juror intended 
to convict regardless of evidence presented at trial;106 however, the 
district court later reversed its own decision and reinstated the origi-
nal verdict upon obtaining evidence that the defendant had been 
aware of the juror bias during trial and failed to inform the court in a 
timely fashion.107  Ultimately, however, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
district court because, while the appellant was wrong in sitting silently 
on the evidence until after the verdict, the Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury was so violated by the knowledge that a juror had 
been actually biased, that a new trial could not be denied.108  Upon 
review, the Eighth Circuit wrote: 
We cannot permit actual, proven bias which prevents a juror from impar-
tially deciding the case, without doing incalculable harm to the jury sys-
tem as an institution.  “The truth pronounced by Justinian more than a 
thousand years ago that, ‘Impartiality is the life of justice,’ is just as valid 
today as it was then.”  The actual bias in this case goes to the heart of the 
integrity of the judicial proceeding.109 
Although Dean dealt with “actual, not potential, juror bias,”110 the rea-
soning must apply when legitimate allegations of juror racial bias are 
presented.  Such a bias is so odious and so arbitrary that to brush it 
off—even due to such a great interest as preserving jury verdicts—
violates the very essence of our judicial system.  As Judge Briscoe 
pointed out in his dissent to the Tenth Circuit’s denial of rehearing 
en banc in Benally, “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury is itself a ‘structural feature’ of the justice system.”111 
The Court has suggested that when it allows jurors to testify post-
verdict as to matters discussed in the jury room, it inflicts a “public in-
jury.”112  The truth of this characterization is undeniable.  Nonethe-
less, when defendants are not able to rely on the juror truthfulness 
 
trary and irrational.  Letting the verdict go unchallenged would be a serious affront to 
notions of equity.  There is little societal value in protecting such a decision.”). 
105 647 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981). 
106 Id. at 782. 
107 Id. at 781. 
108 Id. at 783. 
109 Id. (citations omitted). 
110 Id. 
111 United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 560 F.3d 
1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2009) (Briscoe, J., dissenting). 
112 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (“When the affidavit of a juror, as to the 
misconduct of himself or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a motion for 
a new trial[,] the court must choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant 
and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to 
what had happened in the jury room.”). 
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during voir dire, and when they are then unable to challenge their 
trials as defective simply because another juror unduly delayed in re-
vealing this dishonesty post-verdict, a greater and more significant 
public injury results, one that violates the basic premises of fairness, 
impartiality, and justice at trial.  According to the Tenth Circuit in 
Benally, however, allowing the courts to investigate jury verdicts would 
cause a slippery slope as judges would not stop at the most serious al-
legations or confine their inquiries to allegations of racial preju-
dice.113  But, as Judge Briscoe points out:  “The distinction between an 
‘impartial jury’ and a sober one is the confining characteristic that 
the panel opinion ignores in its effort to grease the proverbial ‘slip-
pery slope.’ . . . . The clear stopping point, in my view, rests in the 
Sixth Amendment requirement of juror impartiality.”114 
Ultimately, it must be for judges to decide in their discretion 
whether allegations of racial prejudice are sufficient to investigate 
whether jurors were truthful at voir dire.115  While this policy may be 
risky and result in some abuse, if our system prohibits jurists from en-
gaging in such investigation at all, we would essentially incentivize ju-
rors to lie, and in making such lies virtually undiscoverable, unhinge 
the entire judicial process. 
As Justice Brennan wrote in his concurrence in Turner v. Murray: 116 
A trial to determine guilt or innocence is, at bottom, nothing more than 
the sum total of a countless number of small discretionary decisions 
made by each individual who sits in the jury box . . . . A racially biased ju-
ror sits with blurred vision and impaired sensibilities and is incapable of 
fairly making the myriad decisions that each juror is called upon to make 
in the course of a trial.  To put it simply, he cannot judge because he has 
prejudged . . . . To sentence an individual to death on the basis of a pro-
ceeding tainted by racial bias would violate the most basic values of our 
criminal justice system.  This the Court understands.  But what it seems not 
to comprehend is that to permit an individual to be convicted by a prejudiced jury 
violates those same values in precisely the same way.117 
Justice O’Connor pointed out in the Tanner majority opinion that 
while the goal of verifying the fairness of every trial was a noble one, 
 
113 See Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 at 1241 (“It may well be true that racial prejudice is an especial-
ly odious, and especially common, form of Sixth Amendment violation.  But once it is 
held that the rules of evidence must be subordinated to the need to admit evidence of 
Sixth Amendment violations, we do not see how the courts could stop at the ‘most se-
rious’ such violations.”). 
114 Id. at 1155–56 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). 
115 See, e.g., United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The people can-
not be expected to respect their judicial system if its judges do not, first, do so.”). 
116 476 U.S. 28 (1986). 
117 Id. at 42–43 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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“[i]t is not at all clear . . . that the jury system could survive such ef-
forts to perfect it.”118  However, as Justice Brennan and Judge Briscoe 
have observed, eliminating racial bias cannot simply be reduced to an 
effort to ‘perfect’ the jury system.  The distinction between a racially 
biased juror and an intoxicated juror is glaring.  The Sixth Amend-
ment to our Constitution guarantees an impartial jury in criminal tri-
als; thus, the decision of a racially biased juror must be vacated as he 
“cannot judge because he has prejudged.”119  Upholding such a con-
viction renders the constitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee meaningless.120 
CONCLUSION 
While our judicial system is rooted in the ideals of equality, neu-
trality, and fundamental fair play, these ideals hinge on assumption 
of a trial by an impartial jury as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  
Jurors who harbor silent biases only to be revealed during delibera-
tion and to infect the ultimate verdict threaten these tenets, the fun-
damental underpinnings of our system.121 
 
118 Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987). 
119 Turner, 476 U.S. at 43. 
120 See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 142 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners are not asking for a per-
fect jury.  They are seeking to determine whether the jury that heard their case behaved 
in a manner consonant with the minimum requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  If we 
deny them this opportunity, the jury system may survive, but the constitutional guarantee 
on which it is based will become meaningless.”). 
121 This Comment addresses racial bias and the particular odiousness of such discrimination 
when it infects jury deliberation.  Of course there are other types of biases a juror can 
harbor that are equally abhorrent, such as gender bias or homophobia, and these biases 
may mar a jury verdict in much the same fashion.  A slippery slope question remains as to 
whether and to what extent any allegations of bias, whether racial or otherwise, ought to 
open the doors to post-verdict inquiry.  This topic merits further exploration in another 
note.  Initially, however, it seems the First Circuit’s reasoning in Villar provides guidance.  
In that case, the court first observed generally that “[m]any courts have recognized that 
Rule 606(b) should not be applied dogmatically where there is a possibility of juror bias 
during deliberations that would violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.”  United 
States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 85–86 (1st Cir. 2009).  The court then concluded:  
[T]here are certain rare and exceptional cases involving racial or ethnic prejudice 
that require hearing jury testimony to determine whether a defendant received a 
fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.  The determination of whether an inquiry is 
necessary to vindicate a criminally accused’s constitutional due process and Sixth 
Amendment rights is best made by the trial judge, who is most familiar with the 
strength of the evidence and best able to determine the probability of prejudice 
from an inappropriate racial or ethnic comment.  
  Id. at 88.  Though it merits further consideration, at first glance it seems this same analy-
sis ought to apply to questions of gender or sexual orientation bias:  if any type of bias 
raises a legitimate possibility of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury, the verdict simply may not lie undisturbed.  In any case, a trial judge who is most fa-
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Though the Tanner Court presented four protections against jury 
impropriety, the protections of observations of the jury by the court 
and counsel, observation by other members of the jury, or non-juror 
evidence of misconduct, are largely ineffective in the context of juror 
racial bias.  It seems the only protection litigants have to ensure that 
the impaneled jury is free of the stain of racial prejudice is probing 
the issue during voir dire.  Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the voir 
dire process in this respect is extremely limited given the extent of 
questions which may be asked, a racist juror’s possible determination 
to hide his inclinations or even a juror’s unconsciousness as to his 
own prejudicial feelings, and tactical reasons for counsel to avoid 
probing into such issues of race prior to trial. 
Nonetheless, though the protections offered by the voir dire 
process are limited, it is, ultimately, all we have.  While there are 
many convincing policy justifications for proscribing the disclosure of 
matters discussed during jury deliberations, in the end a much more 
significant “public injury”122 results if the voir dire protection is de-
nied.  Holding a hearing to investigate whether jurors were truthful 
during voir dire concerns a structural defect in the trial and is not 
analogous to considering the validity of the verdict itself as the Benally 
Court has held.  It is possible, and the Rules of Evidence allow, for in-
formation to be considered for one purpose and not for another.123 
When racial bias taints a jury verdict, the verdict cannot be upheld 
as simply the result of an imperfect, but fair trial.124  In such a case, 
the odiousness of the imperfection intensifies the imperfection to an 
injustice.  Denying that injustice inflicts a greater public injury than 
 
miliar with the facts of the case at bar, is in the best position to make a determination as 
to whether a post-verdict hearing is merited, and the Rules of Evidence, in order to 
uphold the Sixth Amendment right, must allow a district court judge the discretion to do 
so. 
122 See generally McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (“When the affidavit of a juror, as 
to the misconduct of himself or the other members of the jury, is made the basis of a mo-
tion for a new trial[,] the court must choose between redressing the injury of the private 
litigant and inflicting the public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to tes-
tify as to what had happened in the jury room.”). 
123 See Pond, supra note 65, at 237 (“In looking at the operative effect of other evidence rules, 
however, the Tenth Circuit’s fears appear to be overstated.  The Rules of Evidence con-
stantly permit evidence to be admitted for one purpose while forbidding it for others—
even though the practical effect is the same.  For example, a statement may be inadmissi-
ble hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted but may be admissible for some 
other purpose.”). 
124 See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973) (“A defendant is entitled to a fair 
trial but not a perfect one.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bruton v. United States, 
391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (asserting the same proposition); Lutwak v. United States, 344 
U.S. 604, 619 (1953) (same).  
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that which would be suffered by investigating statements made during 
deliberations.  Ultimately, if the voir dire exception is banned by our 
judicial system, none of Tanner’s promises will be fulfilled and the 
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be reduced to an as-
piration rather than an expectation. 
